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Note
The Sartorial Dilemma of Knockoffs: Protecting
Moral Rights without Disturbing the Fashion
Dynamic
Margaret E. Wade
In the months leading up to the wedding of Prince William
and Catherine Middleton‘s wedding, the future Duke and
Duchess of Cambridge kept Catherine‘s gown a secret. But as
soon as she stepped out to reveal Sarah Burton‘s Alexander
McQueen creation to the world, copycat designers began working on knockoffs available for a fraction of the price.1 A similar
phenomenon occurs every year during awards season, when
film and television stars parade in couture gowns on the red
carpet and copycat designers immediately manufacture replicas.2 Beyond the glitz of high couture, an emerging designer‘s
worst nightmare is to discover copies of her original designs in
―fast fashion‖ stores like H&M, Zara, and Forever 21.3 In a typ J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008,
St. Olaf College. Copyright © 2011 by Margaret E. Wade, J.D. Candidate 2012,
University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008, St. Olaf College. Many thanks
to Professor William McGeveran for helpful advice and mentorship, and to the
Editors and Staff of the Minnesota Law Review, notably Laura Arneson and
Sharon Grawe for their helpful suggestions and thoughtful edits. Special
thanks to Miriam Carlson for fashion design inspiration. Finally, deepest
thanks to Marti Wade, Ann-Charlotte Wade, and David Sayre for their constant love and support. Copyright © 2011 by Margaret E. Wade.
1. See Cheryl Wischhover, The First Kate Middleton Knockoff Wedding
Gowns and Accessories Hit Stores; Here Are the Good, the Bad and the Ugly,
FASHIONISTA ( May 2, 2011, 12:10 PM), http://fashionista.com/2011/05/check-out
-the-first-kate-middleton-knockoff-wedding-gowns-and-accessories/; see also
Now You Can Own a Kate Middleton Knockoff Ring, GAWKER (Nov. 20, 2010,
9:12 AM), http://gawker.com/5695043/now-you-can-own-a-kate-middleton-knockoff
-ring (highlighting one example of a Kate Middleton engagement ring knockoff ).
2. See About Us, FAVIANA, http://www.faviana.com/about-us-en.php ( last
visited Oct. 15, 2011) (revealing an industry where copycat designers create
seemingly identical dresses minutes after an awards ceremony).
3. Guillermo C. Jimenez, Fashion Law: Overview of a New Legal Discipline, in FASHION LAW 3, 8 (Guillermo C. Jimenez & Barbara Kolsun eds.,
2010) (noting that the ―fast fashion‖ model, pioneered by Spanish clothing re-
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ical case, designer Elle Sakellis‘ Otrera ―evil eye‖ scarves,
priced at $190, were a huge success until her retailers began
ordering a knockoff version that sold for only $30.4 Fashion piracy is not a new phenomenon, but with the rise of new technology and evolving consumer behaviors, copycat fashion is
more common than ever before.5
Unlike that of most other countries, U.S. copyright law
does not extend to fashion designs.6 Although other forms of intellectual property protect fashion products, the cut of a garment is not protected.7 After nearly a century of lobbying from
fashion designers, there are two bills—the Design Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA)8 and the Innovative Design Protection and
Piracy Prevention Act (IDPPPA)9—that aim to reform the copyright system to include fashion designs. However, critics claim
that protection for fashion designs is unnecessary because the
fashion industry is thriving and copying drives innovation.10
This Note evaluates whether the Copyright Act should be
expanded to include fashion design. Part I provides an overview
of fashion piracy, the current state of intellectual property protection for fashion, and the proposed legislation for a fashion
tailer Zara, creates a ―competitive advantage in speed to market‖ through the
use of information technology).
4. Christina Binkley, The Problem With Being a Trendsetter: Copycat
Fashions Move Faster Than Ever, Making It Harder to Protect Original Ideas;
Smaller Designers Bear the Brunt, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2010, at D8.
5. E.g., Judith S. Roth & David Jacoby, Copyright Protection and Fashion Design, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON COPYRIGHT LAW 2009, at 1099 (PLI
Intellectual Prop. Handbook Ser. No. G-967, 2009) (―The advent of online, real
time access to the exhibition of new designs and rapid-fire manufacturing capabilities through CAD and other technological advances have facilitated design piracy.‖); Reasons to Stop Fashion Piracy: The Testimony of Susan Scafidi, STOP FASHION PIRACY, http://www.stopfashionpiracy.com/index.php/about_
the_bill/ ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (―Today, global changes in both the speed
of information transfer and the locus of clothing and textile production have
resulted in increased pressure on creative designers at all levels, from haute
couture to mass market.‖).
6. E.g., Susan Scafidi, Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Historical Regression, COUNTERFEIT CHIC ( Mar. 10, 2008, 11:28 PM), http://counterfeitchic.com/
2008/03/index.php.
7. E.g., Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm‘n,
114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940) (stating that dress designs are not copyrightable
and ―fall into the public demesne without reserve‖), aff ’d, 312 U.S. 457, 460
n.1 (1941).
8. H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009).
9. S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2010).
10. E.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687,
1691 (2006).
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design copyright. Part II considers both sides of the debate,
analyzing the pros and cons in the arguments of the proponents
and the critics. Part III argues against current fashion legislation that would expand the Copyright Act and proposes a solution that balances moral rights and the benefits of copying.
This Note asserts that the costs of sui generis11 copyright protection outweigh the benefits, and a certification or collective
mark would be a better fit for the fashion industry.
I. FASHION PIRACY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
LEGISLATION
The fashion industry is unparalleled in its social and economic significance.12 This Part illustrates the phenomenon of
fashion piracy, including both the positive and negative aspects
of copying. It then discusses the current state of intellectual
property protections for fashion designers, including an overview of trademarks, trade dress, patents, trade secret, and copyrights. Finally, this Part provides background on recent and
current legislation—the DPPA and the IDPPPA.
A. FASHION PIRACY: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
In order to understand the complexity of fashion piracy,
there are several important distinctions to make regarding the
act of copying, the designers, and the timing.
First, fashion piracy is a very difficult concept to define because it rests on subjective notions of copying.13 There is no
bright line between copying and mere imitation, but fashion piracy is best illustrated by a spectrum of permissible to impermissible copying activity juxtaposed with ethics.14 However,
11. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009) (defining ―sui generis‖—
Latin for ―[o]f its own kind‖—as a term used in intellectual property law ―to
describe a regime designed to protect rights that fall outside the traditional
patent, trademark, copyright, and trade-secret doctrines‖).
12. See Jimenez, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that the fashion and apparel
sector accounts for about four percent of total gross domestic product or more
than $1 trillion per year).
13. For an example of one designer‘s perspective on copying that highlights the subjectivity inherent in the debate on copying in the fashion industry, see Eric Wilson, O.K., Knockoffs, This Is War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006,
at G2 (―[Protecting fashion design] is the most ridiculous thing. . . . There is no
such thing as an original design. All these designers are getting their inspiration from things that were done before. To me a spaghetti strap is a spaghetti
strap, and a cowl neck is a cowl neck.‖).
14. See SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE? 18 (2005) (discussing the
implications of an ethical justification for the legal creation and protection of
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some designers find all copying permissible and other designers
draw a line between inspiration and copying.15 According to the
Council of Fashion Designers of America (CFDA), fashion design piracy ―describes the increasingly prevalent practice of enterprises that seek to profit from the invention of others by
producing copies of original designs under a different label.‖16
However, a degree of copying is inevitable since there are only
a limited number of ways that material may cover the human
form; whenever a designer creates, she must take old ideas and
make them her own.17 Copying is beneficial in many respects
because it allows for collaboration and creativity.18 Every season is marked by trends; designers are inspired by the work of
other designers.19 In a highly vulnerable industry, when one
fashion company‘s collection finds success, other companies will
follow to capitalize on the trend.20 The key legal question is at
what point does copying a trend go too far.21
Although the terms ―knockoff‖ and ―counterfeit‖ are often
used synonymously in ordinary discourse, there is an important
intellectual property); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 95, 143 (1997) (―[T ]he overlap between moral rights and copyright emphasizes the extent to which copyright itself serves to give authors and artists
continuing control over the way in which their work is exploited and, hence,
over their reputation.‖).
15. ULLA VAD LANE-ROWLEY, USING DESIGN PROTECTION IN THE FASHION
AND TEXTILE INDUSTRY 17 (1997) (quoting Italian designer Mario Bellini as
stating that ―[w]hat makes me happy is when I am imitated in a rather clever
way, that is the right way . . . [ b]ut if someone copies the details, I feel robbed
of money and of my inventive rights‖).
16. Design Piracy, COUNCIL OF FASHION DESIGNERS OF AM., http://www
.cfda.com/design-piracy/ ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011); see also Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm‘n, 114 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1940),
aff ’d, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941); SYLVAN GOTSHAL, THE PIRATES WILL GET
YOU: A STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR DESIGN PROTECTION 2 (1945) (―Piracy was
formerly associated with the high seas. We know that it takes place also on
the highways of trade and doesn‘t call for a patch on the eye; only a faulty conscience and a sly hand . . . . Piracy is unauthorized taking, none the less so
when what is taken is a thing of beauty.‖).
17. See, e.g., SUE JENKYN JONES, FASHION DESIGN 74 (2d ed. 2005); SCAFIDI, supra note 14, at 39.
18. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER & LAURIE RACINE, THE NORMAN LEAR CTR.,
READY TO SHARE: CREATIVITY IN FASHION & DIGITAL CULTURE 13–17 (Jan. 29,
2005), available at http://www.learcenter.org/pdf/RTSBollierRacine.pdf.
19. See SHARON LEE TATE, INSIDE FASHION DESIGN 194 (5th ed. 2004).
20. See Wilson, supra note 13.
21. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 16 (―It is necessary to distinguish legal and
acceptable forms of imitation from those that involve inappropriate use of
another company‘s IP.‖).
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legal distinction between these terms.22 Fashion design knockoffs are legal, as illustrated by a dress sold in Forever 21 that
appears indistinguishable from the original Diane Von Furstenberg design.23 On the other hand, counterfeits of fashion
names and logos are illegal, as seen by sunglasses with an unauthorized Dolce and Gabbana logo sold on Canal Street in
Manhattan.24 Identifying this gap in protection, many designers are particularly upset when a copycat designer crosses the
blurry line from inspiration to knockoff.25
Second, fashion piracy has a disparate effect on designers.26 Fashion is a very hierarchical business, often illustrated
by a value pyramid, placing the high-end garments at the top
and the lower-priced garments at the base, indicating the ―proportion of total sales earned respectively by fashion‖ and lowerpriced basics.27 Established fashion designers and couture
houses at the top of the pyramid have the resources and inhouse legal teams to combat copycats with extralegal and intellectual property remedies.28 Moreover, these established designers often appreciate copycat designers because there is no
threat, only flattery.29 Fashion houses have such strong brand
recognition that copycat designs hardly faze them because their
22. Id. at 16–17 (clarifying the distinctions between legal knockoffs, illegal knockoffs, and counterfeiting).
23. Id. at 8–9.
24. Id. at 16–17.
25. E.g., The Industry Speaks Out, STOP FASHION PIRACY, http://www
.stopfashionpiracy.com/index.php/the_industry_speaks_out/ ( last visited Oct.
15, 2011) (―My designs are known for their sophisticated shapes and feminine
silhouettes. The fit, cut, and detailing of our clothes are as much a part of the
Oscar de la Renta brand as our logo itself. They are just as recognizable to our
customers and should be protected equally.‖).
26. Binkley, supra note 4 ( lamenting on the burdens imposed on designers who are faced with piracy in the fashion market).
27. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 12–13, 13 fig.1.2; Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 1693–94, 94 fig.A.
28. Your Questions, LOUIS VUITTON, http://www.louisvuitton.com/us/flash/
index.jsp?direct1=home_entry_us ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Your
Questions] (―To combat [the scourge of counterfeiting], a special team has been
set up in Paris, with offices abroad. Louis Vuitton works with various French
and international professional associations to make consumers aware of the
risks inherent to the purchase of counterfeits.‖).
29. Cameron Silver, President, Decades, Inc., Presentation at Ready to
Share: Fashion & the Ownership of Creativity 127 (Jan. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.learcenter.org/pdf/RTStranscript.pdf (―Coco [Chanel] loved [the
Fauxnel movement] because she said she always wanted to inspire the
street . . . . She encouraged the copying . . . . She wasn‘t threatened by the copies because the truth is the cut could not be replicated.‖).
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loyal consumers identify the original garment and choose to
buy the original over the knockoff.30 Fashion houses also have
the resources to compete with copycat designers by knocking off
their own brands, as seen by Isaac Mizrahi‘s relationship with
Target and Chanel designer Karl Lagerfeld‘s line for H&M.31
Although fashion piracy is a concern for designers at all levels,
there are many options by which an established fashion design
house may protect its designs.32
Many emerging designers, on the other hand, struggle to
enter the market when they have to compete with copycats and
established brands.33 ―Everyone always says that imitation is
the best form of flattery. But it happened too soon . . . . I‘m not
Louis Vuitton. It‘s not like when someone buys a Raj scarf that
they know it‘s an Otrera knockoff,‖ Designer Elle Sakellis
said.34 Since designers must fund the design process on their
own, designers such as Sakellis risk losing their entire investment when a copycat steals their designs.35 Copying can shortcircuit the fashion cycle by devaluing the designer‘s garment
before she can reap any return on the investment.36 Copying dilutes the brand and creates confusion as a young designer attempts to establish her label.37 Unlike the established brand,
whose product is easily distinguishable from copycat versions,
an emerging designer‘s garment does not likely indicate a
unique source, increasing its vulnerability.38 Unlike high-

30. See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 INPROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 115, 121 (Peter K. Yu ed.,
2007) (―Even if a famous designer‘s new line is knocked off, consumers may
still be willing to pay higher prices for the [original].‖).
31. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 1724 (describing ―single-firm
price discrimination strategy‖ or vertical integration, before noting several designers who successfully employ such strategies); Adam Jones & Elizabeth
Rigby, A Good Fit? Designers and Mass-Market Chains Try to Stitch Their
Fortunes Together, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at 17.
32. See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 1724.
33. Scafidi, supra note 30 (noting that emerging designers ―cannot depend
exclusively on brand recognition for protection against design piracy‖).
34. Binkley, supra note 4.
35. See id.
36. See Scafidi, supra note 30, at 125 (describing the ―pattern of consumer
behavior that luxury goods industries can under limited circumstances leverage to create desire for new products‖).
37. See id.
38. Binkley, supra note 4 (elaborating on the unique difficulties that upand-coming fashion designers face when confronted with knockoffs of their
original designs).
TELLECTUAL
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fashion knockoffs, the scenario where emerging designers are
knocked off results in great harm to the new designer.39
Third, the current call for fashion design legislation is
nothing new: designers have fervently cried out against design
piracy for decades.40 There is a long history of the American fashion industry copying other designers.41 For example, in 1964,
more than 2,000 women flocked to Ohrbach‘s ―semi-annual fashion phenomenon‖ in search of ―line-for-line copies‖ of Paris
couture originals.42 The fashion world is notorious for its frenetic pace, demanding fashionistas, and strictly choreographed
routine of spectacular performances.43 Amidst this atmosphere,
copying is standard practice in the fashion business.44 Copycats
snap photos of dresses on the red carpet or the catwalk and
immediately send the photos to factories in China to reproduce
identical garments.45

39. Id. (―Small designers face a particularly large burden; often, they lack
deep pockets to chase down versions they find similar, and their brands are so
little-known that customers often aren‘t aware they‘re not buying an original
design.‖).
40. See also Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm‘n,
114 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1940) (establishing that members of a major fashion
guild have gone as far as boycotting retailers who sold knockoffs), aff ’d, 312
U.S. 457, 468 (1941). See generally Kenneth Collins, Style Piracy, WOMEN‘S
WEAR DAILY, Sept. 25, 1958, reprinted in INSIDE THE FASHION BUSINESS:
TEXT AND READINGS 203, 203 (Jeannette A. Jarnow ed., 2d ed. 1974) (―As everybody knows, the latest Paris openings were marred by bitter charges of
style piracy. No one claimed there was anything new about the situation except the speed with which the fashion thieves worked.‖).
41. E.g., BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 18, at 8.
42. Marilyn Hoffman, Meet Manhattan, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar.
24, 1964, reprinted in INSIDE THE FASHION BUSINESS: TEXT AND READINGS,
supra note 40, at 204 –05.
43. See Jimenez, supra note 3, at 15–16 (describing how clothing manufacturers produce seasonal couture collections six times per year, including
Spring, Summer, Transitional, Fall, Resort, and Holiday, which are shown at
shows in New York, London, Milan, and Paris).
44. See, e.g., INSIDE THE FASHION BUSINESS: TEXT AND READINGS, supra
note 40, at 128 (―The late Norman Norell, considered the dean of American designers, expressed his philosophy about style piracy: ‗I don‘t mind if the knockoff houses give me a season with my dress. What I mind is if they bring out
their copies faster than I get my own dresses to the stores.‘‖).
45. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis,
91 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1392 (2005); see also John Harlow, 2010 Oscars: Copycat
Dresses on Sale Within a Week, THE SUNDAY TIMES ONLINE ( Mar. 7, 2010),
http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/film/oscars/
article7052414.ece ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (illustrating the phenomenon of
knocking off gowns during awards season).
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However, despite the copying norm in the industry, piracy
is heightened in the information age in which the Internet and
digital technology allows copying to occur faster and faster.46 In
2006, lost revenue due to counterfeiting and piracy of fashion
was estimated to be $12 billion.47 Consumer buying behavior
has changed in response to e-commerce, shifting apparel sales
to online retailers that employ new strategies like flash sales
and membership-only benefits.48 Fashion has also exploded in
pop culture through reality television shows that illustrate the
trajectory of an emerging designer.49 The fashion blogosphere
has expanded fashion consciousness far beyond New York City
and Los Angeles, allowing people around the world to follow
brands via more than 1000 fashion blogs.50 Fashion bloggers
have assumed an increasingly more important role in fashion.51
For example, in 2009 bloggers were first seated in the front row
at fashion shows, and Marc Jacobs created an ostrich bag
named the BB after blogger BryanBoy.52 The exponential
growth of mobile blogging is making a huge impact on the fashion world, speeding up the natural proliferation of trends.53 In
the information age, fashion is venturing beyond the runway to
46. See, e.g., Scafidi, supra note 30, at 125–26.
47. Roth & Jacoby, supra note 5, at 1083.
48. See generally Andrew Rice, What’s a Dress Worth?, The Online Retailer Gilt Groupe Offers a Great Deal: Buy Designer Clothes at Deep Discounts.
But is it Good or Bad for Fashion?, NEW YORK MAG., Feb. 14, 2010, at 76.
Other examples of analogous retailers include HauteLook, Rue LaLa, and One
Kings Lane.
49. See, e.g., Project Runway (Weinstein Co. broadcast Dec. 1, 2004 –
present).
50. For examples of such fashion blogs, see BRYANBOY, http://www
.bryanboy.com/; INDEPENDENT FASHION BLOGGERS, http://heartifb.com/; Scott
Schuman, THE SARTORIALIST, http://thesartorialist.com/; see also Cate T. Corcoran, Marketing’s New Rage: Brands Sponsoring Influential Bloggers, WOMEN‘S WEAR DAILY (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.wwd.com/media-news/marketing/
marketings-new-rage-brands-sponsor-influential-bloggers-3230386/print-preview/.
51. See, e.g., Corcoran, supra note 50 (quoting another blogger as stating
that ―[f ]ashion bloggers are a unique combination of publisher and talent,‖
and suggesting that ―[t]his is part of the next evolution of advertising[—]a
more integrated approach‖).
52. Cate T. Corcoran, Fashion’s New Fever: Bloggers in Spotlight as They
Aim for Fame, WOMEN‘S WEAR DAILY ( Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.wwd.com/
media-news/media-features/fashions-new-fever-bloggers-in-spotlight-as-they-aim
-for-fame-2485957/print-preview/.
53. See Jon Sobel, State of the Blogosphere 2010 Introduction, TECHNORATI (Nov. 3, 2010, 9:04 AM), http://technorati.com/blogging/article/state-of-the
-blogosphere-2010-introduction/ (―The significant growth of mobile blogging is
a key trend this year . . . . [The impact of women bloggers] is perhaps felt most
strongly by brands . . . .‖).
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explore new domains and reach new audiences, provoking a
discussion of whether these changes are good or bad for the industry.54 Consequently, the call for protection of fashion designs resounds with greater urgency.
The unique features of copying, designers, and timing fuel
the debate and reinforce the complex nature of the legal issue.55
B. THE CURRENT STATE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION FOR FASHION DESIGNERS
Although the fashion industry is a major economic presence in the United States, federal law protects fashion designers against only some forms of design piracy.56 The current intellectual property regime provides partial protection for
fashion products through a combination of trademarks, trade
dress, patents, trade secrets, and copyrights.57
1. Trademarks
A trademark is most often a brand name or a logo that indicates the source of a particular product.58 For example,
trademark law protects clothing and accessories adorned with a
label, such as a Louis Vuitton purse with the renowned ―LV‖
logo59 or the stitching pattern on a pair of Levis.60 To achieve
trademark protection under the Lanham Act, the name or symbol on a fashion product must distinguish it from other goods in
commerce.61 Trademark law serves dual purposes in preventing
54. See, e.g., Mercedes, Cheap Chic: Do Knockoffs Actually Hurt Designers’
Sales?, GLOBAL PURCHASING COS. FASHION BLOG (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www
.globalpurchasinggroup.com/blog/cheap-chic-do-knockoffs-actually-hurt-designers
-sales/.
55. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 5 (describing the increasing need for fashion
executives to become more knowledgeable about the law as a function of the
unique characteristics of the industry).
56. See, e.g., Malden Mills, Inc. v. Regency Mills, Inc., 626 F.2d 1112,
1113–14 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a copyright owner of a textile design was
entitled to permanent injunction and damages against another design of substantially similar subject matter, representation, shading, composition, and
relative size and placement of elements).
57. See, e.g., Scafidi, supra note 30, at 121–23.
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995); see also
RUDOLF CALLMANN, 3 THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 17.1 (4th ed. 1981).
59. Your Questions, supra note 28 (illustrating ongoing efforts to protect
Louis Vuitton‘s famous ―LV‖ logo).
60. See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867,
871 (2d Cir. 1986).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
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consumer deception in the marketplace and protecting a
fashion company‘s trademark from infringement.62 Although
trademarks do not protect fashion designs, they play a vital
role in preventing consumer confusion with counterfeit fashion
products, namely bags and accessories.63
2. Trade Dress
Trade dress, a subset of trademark law, protects ―a product‘s design, product packaging, color, or other distinguishing,
nonfunctional element of appearance.‖64 For example, trade
dress protects the look of well-known products like a Coca-Cola
bottle65 and a red-and-white pack of Marlboro cigarettes.66 In
2000, the Supreme Court narrowed the applicability of trade
dress when it declined to extend trade dress protection to fashion design in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.67
However, like the greater body of trademark law, trade dress
remains an option for famous accessories, such as the Longchamp Le Pliage tote.68
3. Patents
Utility patents protect new and useful processes and inventions,69 and design patents protect the ornamental features

62. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 2010).
63. E.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108,
115–19 (2d Cir. 2006).
64. Glossary, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/main/
glossary/index.html ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2006) (codifying a similar explanation of the phrase ―trade dress‖).
65. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000)
(―[A] classic glass Coca Cola bottle, for instance, may constitute packaging for
those consumers who drink the Coke and then discard the bottle, but may constitute the product itself for those consumers who are bottle collectors, or part
of the product itself for those consumers who buy Coke in the classic glass bottle, rather than a can, because they think it more stylish to drink from the
former.‖).
66. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Star Tobacco Corp., 879 F. Supp. 379, 385–88
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 62, § 8:4.50 ( listing ―the
‗Marlboro Man‘ western cowboy motif ‖ as one of many examples of protected
trade dress).
67. 529 U.S. at 216 (―[ I ]n an action for infringement of unregistered trade
dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product‘s design is distinctive, and
therefore protectible[sic], only upon a showing of secondary meaning.‖).
68. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 53 fig.2.2.
69. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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of an invention.70 Although patent law primarily caters to
scientists and inventors, fashion designers enjoy some patent
protection.71
Design patents protect the ornamental design of a product
for a term of fourteen years.72 The most common fashion products to acquire this type of patent are accessories like eyeglass
frames, jewelry, and footwear.73 In order to claim a design patent, the product must be novel, nonobvious, and ornamental.74
On the other hand, utility patents protect functional innovations for a term of 20 years.75 In order to claim a utility patent,
a product must be novel,76 nonobvious,77 and useful.78 In fashion, utility patents protect inventions such as Velcro fasteners,
Lycra high-performance textiles, and hazmat gear.79 Utility patents also protect processes, such as a technique for washing
denim jeans to create a specific look.80 Although there are rare
cases where fashion designers have successfully obtained utility patents, the threshold for patent protection is very difficult
to meet.81 The novelty standard essentially prevents an inventor from patenting something that already has an identical
form in the public domain.82 The nonobviousness requirement
goes further, preventing an individual from obtaining a patent
if it is similar enough to other products that people in the industry could have conceived it.83 These requirements prove difficult for a designer to meet because fashions evolve from prior
fashions, and it would be nearly impossible to invent an entirely new and nonobvious garment.84
70. Id. § 171.
71. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 59–66 (describing various protections provided by and limitations inherent in design and utility patents).
72. 35 U.S.C. § 173.
73. See, e.g., Jimenez, supra note 3, at 60.
74. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
75. Id. § 154(a)(2).
76. Id. § 102.
77. Id. § 112.
78. Id. § 101.
79. Scafidi, supra note 30, at 122.
80. E.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Golden Trade. S.r.L., Nos. 92 Civ. 1667
(RPP), 90 Civ. 6291 (RPP), 90 Civ. 6292 (RPP), 1995 WL 710822, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1995).
81. Cf. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 65 (noting that utility patent protection
―is difficult and costly to obtain and costly to maintain‖).
82. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
83. Id. § 103.
84. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. Olga Co., 510 F.2d 336, 340 (2d Cir.
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In addition to the steep threshold requirements for patent
protection, there are practical concerns as a result of the short
timeline to produce fashion apparel and the long timeline to
process a patent application. For 2009, the average total pendency for a patent application was 34.6 months.85 Fashion designers produce at least three or four shows a year, and the
commercial life of a piece of apparel is only a few seasons.86 Also, securing a patent is expensive because of fees charged by
the USPTO for examination,87 as well as attorneys‘ fees. Therefore, patent law does not provide a proper safeguard for fashion
designs because the process of obtaining a patent is too timeconsuming and expensive for most fashion designers.88
4. Trade Secret
A trade secret is valuable information that maintains an
economic advantage over competitors.89 For example, a trade
secret may be a secret recipe, a manufacturing technique, or a
customer list.90 Trade secret protection can theoretically last
forever, but once it leaks out, it is gone.91 In the fashion world,
designers may keep trade secrets for techniques, such as designer Miriam Carlson‘s process for sewing flakes of the mineral mica on delicate fabric.92 However, even if the patterns for a
1975); CHRISTINE COX & JENNIFER JENKINS, BETWEEN THE SEAMS, A FERTILE
COMMONS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FASHION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5–7 (Jan. 29, 2005), available at http://www.learcenter
.org/pdf/RTSJenkinsCox.pdf.
85. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, (2010) at B, available at http://www.uspto
.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.pdf.
86. See Wm. Filene‘s Sons Co. v. Fashion Originators‘ Guild of Am., Inc.,
90 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1937); Samantha L. Hetherington, Fashion Runways
Are No Longer the Public Domain: Applying the Common Law Right of Publicity to Haute Couture Fashion Design, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 43, 47
(2001) ( lamenting on the extensive investments of time and energy necessary
for leading designers to continually update their fashion lines).
87. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(3) (2006) (indicating the requirements to file a
design patent application include a $310 fee, and then there is a $430 fee for
the design patent to issue).
88. See Scafidi, supra note 30, at 115, 122.
89. George Gottlieb et al., An Introduction to Intellectual Property Protection in Fashion, in FASHION LAW, supra note 3, at 37.
90. E.g., Paula M. Weber, From Hire to Fire: Contracts During the Employment Relationship, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON COPYRIGHT LAW 2009, supra note 5, at 280.
91. Gottlieb, supra note 89.
92. See Elizabeth Davies, Miriam Cecilia Carlson, ROCKFORD WOMAN
(Apr. 23, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.rockfordwoman.com/content/miriam-cecilia
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garment are kept secret, most clothing can easily be reverseengineered,93 so trade secrets provide little protection for
fashion designs.
5. Copyrights
Copyright law protects artistic creations—including literature, song, dance, sculpture, painting, photography, movies,
and computer programs—but not ―useful articles‖ like automobiles or clothing.94 Clothing may seem like art, but courts have
classified it as a useful article because it provides warmth and
covers nakedness.95 The legislative history from the enactment
of the Copyright Act explains this separability rule, indicating
that copyright protection would not be extended to useful articles that are not separable from utilitarian elements.96 In addition, copyright does not protect ideas like a sleeve, but it does
protect the expression of ideas like a fabric pattern.97 Although
fashion design is excluded from the copyright regime, fashion
designers still use copyrights to protect fabric prints,98 and images on the surface of clothing and accessories.99

-carlson-0 (describing the launch of designer Miriam Cecelia Carlson‘s line
m.c.c. and Carlson‘s use of the mineral mica in her designs).
93. Julie Tsai, Note, Fashioning Protection: A Note on the Protection of
Fashion Designs in the United States, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 447, 450
(2005).
94. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (2006); see Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover
Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
95. See, e.g., Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie‘s Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455
(2d Cir. 1989); cf. The Industry Speaks Out, supra note 25 (musing that ―the
bestower of patents—who clearly missed McQueen‘s fall 2006 giant gauzewrapped deer antler headdress—deems clothing ‗useful articles,‘ not works of
art‖).
96. H.R. REP. NO. 94 -1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5667, 5668 (―[A]lthough the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee‘s intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of a[ ] . . . ladies‘
dress . . . contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would
not be copyrighted under the bill.‖).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 102( b); see, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880);
Publications Int‘l Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996);
Condotti, Inc. v. Slifka, 223 F. Supp. 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
98. E.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir.
1995); see, e.g., Hamil America, Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1999).
99. E.g., Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills Inc., 519 F. Supp.
730, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see, e.g., Malden Mills, Inc. v. Regency Mills, Inc.,
626 F.2d 1112 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Protections for fashion designs slip through the cracks despite the plethora of potential copyright shields available to the
fashion industry, leaving designers vulnerable to copyists.100 In
response to this concern, fashion industry members have campaigned for fashion design legislation for years, culminating in
the legislation currently pending in Congress.101
C. FASHION DESIGN LEGISLATION
Congress has considered over 70 bills since 1914 to provide
some sort of protection against fashion design piracy, but no
bill has yet been passed.102 In recent years, there has been a
new surge of legislative activity for fashion design protection.103
The evolution of these bills illustrates the concerns that proponents and critics have had with the idea of fashion design protection.
On March 30, 2006, Representative Bob Goodlatte introduced the first version of the Design Piracy and Protection Act
(DPPA) in the House of Representatives.104 Despite support by
prominent designers and the Council of Fashion Designers of
America (CFDA), the bill faced opposition, most notably from
the American Apparel & Footwear Association (AAFA), and
stalled in committee.105 A second version of the DPPA was reintroduced by Representative William Delahunt on April 25,
2007.106 In the Senate, Senator Charles Schumer introduced
the Senate version for the bill on August 2, 2007.107 Neither
version reached a vote.108 The most recent DPPA was reintro100. Laura C. Marshall, Note, Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress Should
Adopt a Modified Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 305, 308–09 (2007).
101. Susan Scafidi, IDPPPA: Introducing the Innovative Design Protection
and Piracy Prevention Act, a.k.a. Fashion Copyright, COUNTERFEIT CHIC (Aug.
6, 2010), http://counterfeitchic.com/2010/08/introducing-the-innovative-design
-protection-and-piracy-prevention-act.html.
102. Marshall, supra note 100, at 314 –15.
103. A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion Design: Hearing on H.R. 5055
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2–3 (2006) (statement of the United
States Copyright Office).
104. H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006); Anya Jenkins Ferris, Note, Real Art
Calls for Real Legislation: An Argument Against Adoption of the Design Piracy
Prohibition Act, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 559, 567 (2008).
105. See Ferris, supra note 104 (indicating that no vote was taken); Scafidi,
supra note 101; The Industry Speaks Out, supra note 25.
106. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. (2007).
107. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. (2007).
108. Id.; H.R. 2033.

350

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:336

duced in the house by Representative Delahunt on April 30,
2009,109 and on August 5, 2010 Senator Schumer introduced
the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act
(IDPPPA) in the Senate, which received support from both the
CFDA and the AAFA.110 The IDPPPA passed the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on December 6, 2010 and later died in
committee.111 On July 13, 2011, Representative Robert Goodlatte introduced the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy
Prevention Act in the House, and it was subsequently referred
to the House Committee on the Judiciary, and later referred to
the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition and
the Internet.112 The IDPPPA may be reintroduced in the Senate
this year.
1. The Design Piracy Prohibition Act
The DPPA would amend Title 17 of the United States Code
to extend protection to fashion designs.113 Instead of a direct
amendment to the copyright act, the bill proposes an amendment to § 1301, which provides sui generis protection only for
certain facets of watercrafts.114 ―Fashion design‖ is defined as
―the appearance as a whole of an article of apparel, including
its ornamentation‖ and ―original elements . . . or the original
arrangement . . . of . . . non-original elements‖ in ―the article of
apparel.‖115 The term ―apparel‖ is defined rather broadly, including, in addition to clothing, ―gloves, footwear, and headgear; handbags, purses, wallets, duffel bags, suitcases, tote
bags, and belts; and eyeglass frames.‖116 To qualify for a threeyear term of protection under the DPPA,117 the designer must
apply for registration ―within 6 months after the date on which
109. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009).
110. Innovative Design Protection and Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th
Cong. (2010); Scafidi, supra note 101.
111. S. 3728.
112. Innovative Design Protection and Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th
Cong. (2011).
113. H.R. 2196.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006); H.R. 2196; see also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 472 (5th ed. 2010)
(explaining that Congress has passed two design protection statutes, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (17 U.S.C. §§ 901–14) and the Vessel
Hull Design Protection Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–32), that ―create sui generis
forms of legal protection to fill in gaps in the intellectual property landscape‖).
115. H.R. 2196 § 2(a)(7).
116. Id. § 2(a)(9).
117. Id. § 2(d)(a)(2).
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the design is first made public‖118 The DPPA also includes a
public, computerized database containing visual representations and information for all of the registered fashion designs.119
An act of infringement occurs when a protected fashion design, or an image of the design, is copied ―without the consent
of the owner of the protected design.‖120 However, there is no
infringement under the DPPA if the allegedly copied design is:
(1) ―original and not closely and substantially similar in overall
visual appearance to a protected design,‖ (2) ―merely reflect[ing] a trend,‖ or (3) ―the result of independent creation.‖121
The DPPA sets the maximum damages at the greater of
―$250,000 or $5 per copy.‖122 Thus, the defining features of the
DPPA are the ―closely and substantially similar‖ standard, the
proposed searchable fashion design database, and the threeyear term of protection.
2. The Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention
Act
Like its predecessor, the IDPPPA would amend § 1301 of
the Copyright Act to extend protection to fashion designs.123
The IDPPPA limits the term ―Fashion design‖ to the original
elements or arrangements of the article of apparel to those that
―are the result of a designer‘s own creative endeavor; and provide a unique, distinguishable, nontrivial and nonutilitarian
variation over prior designs for similar types of articles.‖124 The
IDPPPA defines ―apparel‖ nearly identically to the definition in
the DPPA.125 The IDPPPA also provides for the same threeyear term of protection as the DPPA.126
However, the IDPPPA also differs from the DPPA in many
respects. Most notably, there is no registration requirement

118. Id. § 2(f ).
119. Id. § 2( j).
120. Id. § 2(e)(1).
121. Id. § 2(e)(3). The term ―trend‖ is defined in § 2(a)(10) as ―a newly popular concept, idea, or principle expressed in, or as part of, a wide variety of designs of articles of apparel that create an immediate amplified demand for articles of apparel embodying that concept, idea, or principle.‖
122. Id. § 2(g).
123. S. 3728, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
124. Id. § 2(a)(2)(B)(7)(B).
125. Compare id. § 2(a)(2)(B)(9), with H.R. 2196 § 2(a)(9).
126. S. 3728 § 2(d)(a)(2); see also H.R. 2196 § 2(d)(a)(2).
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under the IDPPPA,127 and consequently, no searchable database.128 In the IDPPPA, a design is not an infringing article if
the design (1) ―is not substantially identical in overall visual
appearance to and as to the original elements of a protected design,‖ (2) ―is the result of independent creation,‖ or (3) if the
home sewing exception applies.129 This heightened standard of
―substantially identical‖ requires a claimant to show that an
article of apparel ―is so similar in appearance as to be likely to
be mistaken for the protected design, and contains only those
differences in construction or design which are merely trivial.‖130 The pleading requirements of the IDPPPA specify that
the claimant must establish that (1) plaintiff‘s design is protected, (2) defendant‘s design is infringing, and (3) ―it can be
reasonably inferred from the totality of the surrounding facts
and circumstances‖ that the defendant knew of the protected
design.131 Damages under the IDPPPA are much less than
those under the DPPA because the senate bill limits damages
to the greater of $50,000 or $1 per copy.132 Also, the IDPPPA
increases the penalties for false representation.133
In consideration of the unique facets of the fashion industry, the ongoing problem of fashion piracy, and the current intellectual property protections available to designers, the proposed legislation can be thoughtfully analyzed. After ―eightynine failed attempts to increase IP protection for the fashion
industry,‖134 discussion of fashion design piracy has evolved into a fervent debate, dividing designers, scholars, and industry
stakeholders into two camps: those in favor of the fashion design legislation and those opposed to the fashion design
legislation.135

127. S. 3728 § 2(f )(2).
128. Compare id., with H.R. 2196 § 2( j).
129. S. 3728 § 2(e)(2)(e)(3).
130. Id. § 2(a)(2)(B)(10).
131. Id. § 2(g)(2)(e)(1).
132. See 17 U.S.C. § 1323 (2006). Compare id., with H.R. 2196 § 2(a).
133. S. 3728 § 2(h).
134. Alissandra Burack, Comment, Is Fashion an Art Form that Should be
Protected or Merely a Constantly Changing Media Encouraging Replication of
Popular Trends?, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 605, 619 (2010).
135. Compare Marshall, supra note 100, at 322–26 (urging Congress to
adopt modified design protection), with Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10
(arguing that ―[t]he fashion industry flourishes despite a near-total lack of
protection for its core product, fashion designs‖).
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II. DRESS WARS: ANALYZING THE FASHION DESIGN
DEBATE
This Part summarizes opposing views on protection of
fashion designs. It considers the philosophical motivations,
economic justifications, and pragmatic concerns, from both the
perspective of the proponents and the critics. The current discussion echoes the historical debate following the Supreme
Court‘s 1941 decision in Fashion Originators’ Guild of America
v. Federal Trade Commission136 that provoked Guild leader
Maurice Rentner to lobby Congress to grant copyright protections for designers, claiming that ―a failure to do so would put
the fashion business in mortal danger.‖137 In 1947, department
store owner Leon Bendel Schmulen countered in The New York
Times ―that copying was ‗no danger to the business‘ and a ‗natural consequence of fashion.‘‖138 The debate on whether fashion
is in danger continues with the current sui generis copyright
proposals.
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXPANDING THE COPYRIGHT ACT TO
INCLUDE FASHION DESIGN
Proponents of intellectual property protection for fashion
design have supported direct amendments to the copyright
act,139 trade dress protection,140 and various forms of sui generis
copyright protection.141 While their conceptions of the ideal solution may differ, there are many arguments in common, including an interest in moral rights, efforts for international
consistency, a parallel to architecture, and concern for the
plight of emerging designers.

136. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
137. Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, Is the Design Piracy Prohibition Act
a Good Idea?, FREAKONOMICS BLOG ( Mar. 12, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www
.freakonomics.com/2010/03/12/should-fashion-be-protected-by-copyright-laws-a
-guest-post/.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Kristin L. Black, Note, Crimes of Fashion: Is Imitation Truly
the Sincerest Form of Flattery?, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 505, 516–18 (2010);
Ferris, supra note 104.
140. See, e.g., N. Elizabeth Mills, Intellectual Property Protection for Fashion Design: An Overview of Existing Law and a Look Toward Proposed Legislative Changes, 5 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 24, para. 8 (2009).
141. E.g., Irene Tan, Comment, Knock it off, Forever 21! The Fashion Industry’s Battle Against Design Piracy, 18 J.L. & POL‘Y 893, 921–24 (2010).
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1. Moral Rights: Fashion Designers Are Artists
At the root of nearly all of the arguments in favor of fashion design legislation is a concern for fairness. Although the
law makes a clear distinction between knockoffs and counterfeits,142 proponents claim that design piracy is no different than
―counterfeiting without the label.‖143 They believe that fashion
design creations are art—even if they have functional aspects—
and deserve protection like paintings, music, and sculpture.144
For example, museums around the world display couture garments.145 Proponents identify the ―growing acceptance of fashion designs as works of art‖ as an indication that designers are
artists, worthy of the protections afforded by authorship status.146
Legal scholars Hansmann and Santilla identify
four distinct rights that are commonly referred to collectively as authors‘ and artists‘ ―moral rights‖: the right of integrity, under which
the artist can prevent alterations in his work; the right of attribution
or paternity, under which the artist can insist that his work be distributed or displayed only if his name is connected with it; the right of
disclosure, under which the artist can refuse to expose his work to the
public before he feels it is satisfactory; and the right of retraction or
withdrawal, under which the artist can withdraw his work even after
it has left his hands.147

Although the United States generally does not recognize moral
rights,148 Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) in 1990, indicating a willingness to consider a moral rights
perspective.149 VARA protects the rights of integrity and attribution for visual artists.150 With this concern for the artist behind the dress, many proponents look to Europe, where moral
rights have a greater presence than in the United States.151

142. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 16.
143. Reasons to Stop Fashion Piracy, STOP FASHION PIRACY, http://www
.stopfashionpiracy.com/ ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
144. Tsai, supra note 93, at 461–63; The Industry Speaks Out, supra note 25.
145. E.g., Sara R. Ellis, Note, Copyrighting Couture: An Examination of
Fashion Design Protection and Why the DPPA and IDPPPA Are a Step Towards the Solution to Counterfeit Chic, 78 TENN. L. REV. 163, 187 (2010); Tsai,
supra note 93, at 461.
146. Ellis, supra note 145, at 186–87.
147. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 14, at 96.
148. Id.
149. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), Pub. L. No. 101-650 (codified as amended in scattered §§ of 17 U.S.C. (2006)).
150. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
151. See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 14, at 97.
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2. The United States Should Follow International Models
Proponents contend that a lack of design protection prevents American designers from reaping the rewards of their
work and places them at a disadvantage in the global marketplace.152 They believe that the United States should follow the
legal frameworks in other countries, which convey a greater
appreciation for fashion.153 Countries with vibrant fashion industries—such as France,154 Japan,155 and Italy156—provide legal protection for fashion designs. Even beyond the typical
fashion circuit, countries like India protect the intellectual
property of their fashion designers.157 In Europe, fashion designers enjoy both protection by national laws and protection
by the individual European countries and the European Directive on the Legal Protection of designs (E.U. Directive).158
French designers have been protected since 1793 under the
―doctrine of the unity of art.‖159 With the strongest legal protection for fashion designs in the world, France subjects copyright
infringers to both civil suits for damages and criminal penalties, including a fine of 300,000 Euros and up to three years in
jail for infringement.160 Compared to other countries in the

152. See The Industry Speaks Out, supra note 25.
153. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 100, at 322–24.
154. See Loi 94 -361 du 10 mai 1994 art. L112-2 [Law 94 -361 of May 10,
1994, art. 112-2], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 11, 1994, p. 6863, unofficial translation
available at http:// natlawip.abra.info/european/france/frenchlegislation/prfr7.htm
(including ―articles of fashion‖ in the copyright act).
155. See Isho Ho [Design Law], Law No. 125 of 1959, art. 3 (Japan), translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 6875A (2005), translation available at
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/DACT.pdf.
156. See Emily S. Day, Double-Edged Scissor: Legal Protection for Fashion
Design, 86 N.C. L. REV. 237, 267 (2007) (quoting Alberto Musso & Mario Fabiam, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 2(4)(C) (Paul
Edward Gellar ed., 2006)) (―Finally, Italian copyright law extends protection to
‗works of industrial design displaying creative character and per se artistic
value.‘‖).
157. See The Designs Act, No. 16 of 2000, INDIA CODE (2000), translation
available at http://indiacode.nic.in/ (search for ―Designs Act‖); see also Biana
Borukhovich, Note, Fashion Design: The Work of Art That is Still Unrecognized in the United States, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 155, 166–67
(2009).
158. Council Directive 98/71, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28 (EC).
159. See Borukhovich, supra note 157, at 167; see also Scafidi, supra note
30, at 117.
160. See Borukhovich, supra note 157, at 168.
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global market, there is a considerable gap in United States
copyright protection.161
3. Fashion Design Should Parallel the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act
Proponents of expanding protection to fashion design also
draw a parallel to architecture copyrights.162 Until 1990, architectural buildings, unlike blueprints, had little protection: the
physical structures could be copied, but architectural plans
were protected.163 In 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed
into law the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act,
which expanded the subject matter of the Copyright Act to include ―architectural works.‖164 Even though architectural designs are not physically separable from architectural works,
this new category ―does not implicate the ‗physical or conceptual separability‘ conundrum that bedevils protection for useful
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural (PGS) works.‖165 Proponents
may be attracted to this more direct route because the sui generis amendment appears like a ―second class‖ copyright and
they think fashion design is worthy of full copyright protection
under § 102 of the Copyright Act.

161. See Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 84 (2006) [hereinafter Scafidi Statement] (written statement of Susan Scafidi, Professor) (―The global legal trend toward
fashion design protection has rendered the U.S. an outlier among nations that
actively support intellectual property protection, a position that is both politically inconsistent and contrary to the economic health of the domestic fashion
industry.‖).
162. E.g., Kristin L. Black, Note, Crimes of Fashion: Is Imitation Truly the
Sincerest Form of Flattery?, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 505, 508 (2010); Brandon Scruggs, Note, Should Fashion Design Be Copyrightable?, 6 NW. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 122, 127 (2007).
163. See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that traced blueprints infringed the originals, but that the construction of an identical building would not violate a copyright in blueprints).
164. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2006); see also Id. § 101 (defining ―architectural
works‖ as ―the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings‖ and including
―the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and
elements in the design‖ as protected elements of the work).
165. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.20[A] (2011).
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4. Barriers to Entry: Designers Are Harmed
Piracy creates an obstacle in the path of new designers in
particular.166 Since knockoffs can enter the market faster, the
consumer sees the copy before the original, creating confusion.167 Even if the consumer is not fooled by the knockoff, other consumers may be confused under the doctrine of post-sale
confusion.168 When a pirate creates a knockoff of a designer‘s
work, the designer has economic loss from the lack of profits.169
As a result, the designer is economically hurt as the knockoffs
replace sales and demand for the original garment declines.170
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXPANDING THE COPYRIGHT ACT TO
INCLUDE FASHION DESIGN
The Piracy Paradox, with its economic approach to fashion
piracy, is the most prominent voice of opposition in the debate.171 Critics contend that the pending legislation has great
potential to negatively affect the multifaceted fashion industry,
namely fashion designers, consumers, the courts, and other
creative fields.172
1. Utilitarian Theory
In the United States, intellectual property rights are premised on a utilitarian theory rather than a natural rights

166. Binkley, supra note 4.
167. E.g., Sara R. Ellis, supra note 145, at 188–90.
168. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code,
123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 851 (2010) (“This doctrine holds that even if consumers
are not confused at the point of sale as to the true source of the goods that they
are purchasing, other consumers may be confused as to the source of those
goods after the sale.‖).
169. E.g., Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2006) (statement of Jeffrey Banks, Fashion
Designer) (describing how fashion design piracy ―robs American [designers] of
their livelihood‖).
170. E.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1176 (2009).
171. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Response, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2009); Kal Raustiala & Christopher
Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006).
172. E.g., Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 13–14 (2006) [ hereinafter Wolfe Testimony] (testimony of David Wolfe, Creative Director, The Doneger Group).
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theory.173 The Constitution grants Congress the power ―to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖174 Tension arises
between a utilitarian approach, prioritizing society before individual, and a moral rights approach, prioritizing the individual.175 Under a utilitarian perspective, critics of the proposed
legislation view isolated cases of fashion piracy as unnecessary
reasons to change a thriving industry.176
2. The Proposed Bill Will Harm Stakeholders
Critics claim that the fashion industry is thriving without
protection for fashion design and this bill will upset the rituals
and synchronized rhythm of the field.177 Many critics believe
―there would be no fashion‖ with fashion design copyright
laws.178 They contend that a sui generis amendment to the copyright act would create more harm to designers, consumers,
and courts than any potential benefits of a fashion design copyright.
First, the bill will negatively affect fashion designers from
established couture houses to young designers launching out of
Parsons to Faviana knockoff designers.179 Trends create jobs,
whereas a copyright monopoly on a style will prevent other designers from capitalizing on the idea.180 The knockoff houses
173. See Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21
HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 65 (1997) (―Society seeks to maximize utility in the form
of scientific and cultural progress by granting rights to authors and inventors
as an incentive toward such progress.‖).
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
175. Moore, supra note 173, at 66.
176. See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 1727–28.
177. Id. at 1691. Cf. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS & U.S. DEP‘T OF
LABOR, Fashion Designers, in OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 309
(2010–11 ed.), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos291.htm (―Employment
of fashion designers is projected to grow by 1 percent between 2008 and
2018.‖).
178. Videotape: The Ecology of Creativity in Fashion (The Norman Lear
Center 2005), available at http://www.learcenter.org/html/projects/?&cm=ccc/
fashionsched; see also Wolfe Testimony, supra note 172 (comparing the fashion
industry to a balanced ecosystem of an ocean reef to emphasize the symbiotic
elements of originality, creativity, and copying).
179. See Lynsey Blackmon, Note, The Devil Wears Prado: A Look at the Extension of Copyright Protection to the World of Fashion, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 107,
141– 43 (2007); Ferris, supra note 104, at 559.
180. See Blackmon, supra note 179, at 142– 43; see also Wolfe Testimony,
supra note 172, at 16–19.
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will suffer in particular, but job losses will occur throughout the
industry because designers at every level engage in some degree of copying.181 Litigation will require designers to spend
more time in court and less time creating.182 Designers will
need to spend time and money enforcing their copyrights, and
they will likely argue over whether copying occurred in the first
place.183 Because of these hidden costs in the proposed legislation, critics contend that it will likely have a disproportionate
impact on small fashion companies and emerging designers.184
Second, the negative effects on designers will trickle down
to hurt consumers.185 If the bill is passed, fashion companies
will need to adjust for the increased costs of litigation and filing
expenses, and they will likely pass these new costs on to consumers.186 In short, the cost of clothing will go up.187 If copycat
designers are prevented from replicating couture styles, the variety in clothing will go down, and stylish clothing will be less
accessible.188
Third, the bill will burden the courts through excessive litigation over an ambiguous standard.189 The substantially similar, identical standard is problematic. Even after many tries at
creating the bill, the language is still too vague; the standard of
―substantially identical‖ will be time consuming and difficult
for the courts to determine. The courts lack the expertise to decide disputes over imitation in fashion.190 To the average judge,
two garments may look alike, but to industry insiders, they
may see two entirely different pieces.

181. See Blackmon, supra note 179, at 142– 43.
182. See Ferris, supra note 104, at 584.
183. See Wolfe Testimony, supra note 172, at 16–20.
184. See Ferris, supra note 104, at 584.
185. See Blackmon, supra note 179, at 145– 46.
186. See id.
187. See Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 87–89 (2006) (outlining the prepared statement
of Christopher Sprigman); Staci Riordan, The “Destruction of Affordable Fashion Bill” Or IDPPPA Gets One Step Closer to Becoming Fashion Law,
FASHION L. BLOG: AN INTERACTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE BUSINESS OF FASHION
(Dec. 2, 2010), http://fashionlaw.foxrothschild.com/2010/12/articles/design-piracy
-prohibition-act/the-destruction-of-affordable-fashion-bill-or-idpppa-gets-one-step
-closer-to-becoming-fashion-law/.
188. See Wolfe Testimony, supra note 172, at 19–20.
189. See Blackmon, supra note 179, at 144 – 45.
190. See Wolfe Testimony, supra note 172, at 19–20.
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Fourth, critics warn that the proposed legislation will be a
slippery slope. The debate on whether to adopt fashion design
legislation is much larger than fashion because it stems from
the philosophical perspectives underlying intellectual property
law. The outcome of the debate has the potential of making
significant waves across various other arguably underprotected
fields, such as magic tricks,191 stand-up comedy,192 hairstyles,
tattoos,193 and cuisine.194
3. The Piracy Paradox: Knockoffs Benefit the Fashion
Industry
In a traditional intellectual property system, the incentive
thesis ―predicts that, absent intellectual property protection
against third-party appropriation of sale proceeds, manufacturers and creators will limit or cease investment.‖195 Although the
presence of knockoffs is rapidly increasing, the American fashion industry has not been harmed by the lack of design copyright—in fact it has thrived.196 Unlike the traditional model,
knockoff fashion designs have not harmed designers by taking
away a considerable amount of sales.197 Raustiala and Sprigman use the phrase ―low-IP equilibrium‖ to suggest ―that the
three core forms of IP law—copyright, trademark, and patent—
provide only very limited protection for fashion designs, and yet
this low level of legal protection is politically stable.‖198 Fashion
does not adhere to the orthodox understanding of IP law in
which piracy is a ―fatal threat to the incentive to engage in creative labor,‖199 but instead ―the lack of design protection in fashion is not especially harmful to fashion innovators, and hence
191. See Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians’ Intellectual
Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123,
123–24 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010).
192. See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation
of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1789–92 (2008).
193. Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 97, 99–102 (2003).
194. Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual
Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 188 (2008).
195. Barnett, supra note 45, at 1381–82.
196. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 171, at 1212–13; Ferris, supra note
104, at 579.
197. Ferris, supra note 104, at 580.
198. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 1699.
199. Id. at 1717.
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they are not incentivized to change it.‖200 Barnett offers an explanation, hypothesizing that the presence of the knockoffs allows the designers to charge a ―snob premium‖ for the original
and popularizes the trend.201
Raustiala and Sprigman offer an alternative explanation
for why knockoffs benefit the fashion community: the piracy
paradox, which rests on two principles.202 First, induced obsolescence is the process by which ―IP rules providing for free appropriation of fashion designs accelerate the diffusion of designs and styles.‖203 Second, anchoring occurs when ―readily
discernible trends nonetheless emerge and come to define a
particular season‘s style,‖204 which ultimately drives consumption. The ―piracy paradox‖ is the notion that ―copying fails to
deter innovation in the fashion industry because, counterintuitively, copying is not very harmful to originators
[and] . . . may actually promote innovation and benefit originators.‖205 The term ―piracy paradox‖ refers to the manner in
which copying ―generate[s] more demand for new designs, since
the old designs—the ones that have been copied—are no longer
special‖ and results in ―greater sales of apparel.‖206 Knockoffs
help drive the trend, which increases the value of the original
and urges designers to innovate.207 Knockoffs also make designs more affordable, so more people can wear them because
―Vera Wang and Allen B. Schwartz aren‘t selling to the same
crowds.‖208 Finally, it spurs more innovation because designers
have to stay ahead of copycats.209
From a creative perspective, the lack of legal protection for
fashion design has resulted in a rich bricolage that allows for
―constant mixing and morphing of incongruous ‗found‘ elements
into a new synthesis.‖210 Articulating the culture of copying
among designers, fashion writer Holly Brubach once wrote,
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 1718.
Barnett, supra note 45, at 1385.
Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 1687.
Id. at 1722.
Id. at 1728.
Id. at 1691.
Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 137.
Ezra Klein, Copycats vs. Copyrights, THE DAILY BEAST, NEWSWEEK
ONLINE (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/08/20/
copycats-versus-copyrights.html.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 18, at 4.
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―Fashion is one of the means by which we dream collectively.‖211 Reflecting on the importance of appropriation, designer
Tom Ford once said, ―You couldn‘t design without [appropriation]—I mean, none of us invented the sleeve. We have two
arms. You need two sleeves.‖212 The Piracy Paradox explains
both the economic and creative success in the fashion industry
amidst rampant copying.
III. TAILORING A SOLUTION TO FIT FASHION DESIGN
The proponents and critics of the legislation present
thoughtful arguments for the fashion design community, yet
there are significant concerns about either adopting proposed
legislation or maintaining the status quo.213 A solution that acknowledges the importance of attribution will address the concerns of the fashion design community, without creating more
harm to stakeholders. The next Sections evaluate both sides of
the debate on whether the proposed legislation is necessary,
and propose a solution to protect attribution rights and to assure authenticity of original designs through certification and
collective marks.
A. BOTH ARGUMENTS ARE FLAWED
While both sides of the debate present important concerns,
neither side‘s solution fully responds to the unique nature of
the fashion design community. The proponents of sui generis
protection advocate for an expansion of intellectual property
rights to fashion that is dangerously broad. On the other hand,
critics recognize the benefits of copying, but fail to see the value
in protecting the moral rights of fashion designers.
1. Proponents Fail to Consider the Risks of Sui Generis
Protection
Proponents of expanding the Copyright Act to include fashion design fail to consider three main concerns. First, adopting
a fashion design copyright could create oppressive monopolies
in the fashion community that would put an end to creativity
for emerging designers and interrupt the delicate balance of
211. Id. at 19.
212. Tom Ford, Former Creative Dir., Gucci, Remarks at Ready to Share:
Fashion & the Ownership of Creativity 45 (Jan. 29, 2005), available at http://
www.learcenter.org/pdf/RTStranscript.pdf.
213. See supra Part II.
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innovation.214 Second, the ―substantially identical‖ standard
will be difficult for courts to apply and will most likely result in
frivolous litigation, increased costs for consumers, and fewer
clothing styles on the market. And third, the negative impact
would likely spread beyond fashion to result in a slippery slope
problem for other creative industries.
Architecture provides the best analogy for a fashion design
amendment to the Copyright Act, but there are pragmatic issues that would make a direct amendment highly unlikely.
There is a disparity in volume—the apparel industry is considerably larger than that of architecture. Unlike architecture,
the life of a fashion design is transitory. The artistic and functional elements are more easily separated in a building than a
garment because a building may have an ornate exterior and a
functional purpose inside. These differences chip away at the
parallel and illustrate why fashion design does not fit neatly into the copyright act.
Compared to the rest of the world, the U.S. copyright system appears to have a major gap, but the proponents of the bill
ignore the evolution of U.S. copyright law in favor of attractive
models across the pond. The moral rights argument has merit,
but it is problematic in light of the utilitarian system in the
United States. Implementing a gradual form of moral rights, in
line with VARA, would be more realistic than attempting to
copy the French copyright system. Proponents of the bill astutely identify the significant concerns of the emerging designer who is cut out of the fashion cycle, but they champion the
wrong solution.
In sum, the proposed sui generis copyright protection for
fashion designs is not a good solution for the knockoff dilemma
because the costs outweigh the benefits. While the proponents
are motivated by valid concerns for moral rights, the expansion
will be problematic on multiple levels. First, the judicial system
is not the best option for policing copying because the standard
is difficult to apply and industry insiders will be better judges.
Second, although the proponents make a strong argument for
moral rights, the U.S. copyright system has an inherently utilitarian perspective that cannot be overlooked. Third, when analyzing the unique fashion design industry as a whole, there is
no economic justification for a fashion design copyright.

214. See COX & JENKINS, supra note 84, at 6.
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2. Critics Fail to Consider Moral Rights
The critics aptly identify serious costs that would result
from the proposed legislation, and they recognize the unique
nature of fashion and the benefits of imitation and remix in the
fashion world.215 While the economic explanation proves wise,
it focuses on the large fashion designers, not the emerging designers. Vera Wang is barely harmed if Allen B. Schwartz copies her bridal gowns, but the young scarf designer Sakellis is
economically and morally harmed if her scarf design is copied.216 The critics fail to acknowledge the considerable infringement of moral rights in the context of emerging designers. While the U.S. intellectual property system is founded on
utilitarian motives, intangible motives play a large part in the
fashion design community.217 Designers are concerned about
their moral rights and the solution should reflect those
concerns.
B. PROPOSAL: BALANCING MORAL RIGHTS AND CREATIVE
FREEDOM
From within the fashion design debate emerges a convincing economic analysis from the critics and a significant concern
for emerging designers from the proponents. The proposed legislation is not the best solution because it fails to reconcile
these competing concerns. Instead of relying on the Copyright
Act, proponents should shift their attention to trademark law—
―the most universally applicable and flexible mechanism of the
protection of fashion design.‖218
In general, copying in the fashion industry has beneficial
effects, but there are situations where individual designers are
hurt from copying. A solution that allows for copying but still
recognizes the moral rights of designers will allow fashion design to continue to flourish, while recognizing the sincere concerns of the huge industry. While the costs of expanding the
Copyright Act outweigh the benefits, carving out protection for
the moral rights of fashion designers in the trademark act will
benefit all fashion stakeholders.

215.
216.
217.
218.

Wolfe Testimony, supra note 172, at 19–20.
See, e.g., Klein, supra note 207.
See, e.g., Scafidi Statement, supra note 161, at 79.
Scafidi, supra note 30.

2011]

FASHION PIRACY

365

1. The Right of Attribution
When celebrities walk down the red carpet, reporters routinely ask, ―Who are you wearing?‖ Fashion designs are intimately connected with the designer, even if there are no logos.
There are both intangible and tangible concerns related to protecting the designer‘s name. Many designers create for the love
of fashion and design, seeking only the reward of notoriety and
a positive review in Women’s Wear Daily. In a fast-paced industry that rides trends, reputation and recognition is very
significant.
Among the four well-known moral rights,219 attribution
stands out as an ideal choice for fashion designers because it
would not upset the system and it would achieve the goal of
protecting the name of the designer. It would be impractical to
apply a right of integrity to fashion design because consumers
alter and tailor clothing to achieve a good fit.220 Similarly, the
right of disclosure would not make sense since fashion is intended to be visible and worn in public. The right to withdraw
is likewise inapplicable because of the public and functional aspects of apparel. Compared to the other moral rights, the right
of attribution—the artists‘ right to insist that her name continue to be associated with work she has produced and to insist
that her name not be used on work she has not in fact produced—responds to the concern for emerging designers, and it
would not radically change the current U.S. intellectual property regime.
A right of attribution specifically addresses the needs of
fashion designers. In working on a collection, a designer must
carefully mold her reputation and brand identity so the line
communicates a unique source and authentic story.221
Throughout history designers have sought to protect their attribution rights in their collections. In the 1920s and 1930s, designers sought to create marks of authenticity, such as the
thumbprint labels in Madeleine Vionnet‘s atelier.222 Likewise,
the period of logomania in the 1980s was an effort to guard
219. See, e.g., Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 14, at 95–96.
220. Cf. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, Sept. 9, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, art. 6bis., 1161 U.N.T.S. 30
(stating that the author shall have the right ―to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification‖ of the work).
221. E.g., BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 18, at 23 (―Designers have credibility, stature and profitability because their name comes to represent a look
and an artistic standard.‖).
222. See Scafidi, supra note 30, at 124.
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garments through trademark law by adorning apparel with an
abundance of exterior labels.223 These historical efforts underline the significance of attribution in the fashion design industry.
2. Fashion Mark Mechanism
A certification mark or collective mark would allow designers to opt in for protection of their moral rights without drastically changing the intellectual property regime. The Lanham
Act provides for two types of marks that have not traditionally
been used to protect fashion designs, but may solve the dilemma of source identification, without interrupting the copying
dynamic.224
A certification mark is most often used by trade associations or other organizations ―to identify a certain type of product.‖225 For example, the ―Underwriters Laboratory‖ or ―UL‖
mark shows that a product meets specific safety standards,226
and the ―Roquefort‖ mark indicates that cheese has been manufactured in a specific region of France and according to a particular process.227 Thus, ―a certification mark is symbolic of a
guarantee or the meeting of certain standards.‖228 A mark may
be registered as a certification mark, another subset of trademark law, pursuant to § 4 of the Lanham Act,229 and courts
have found that common law certification marks can be protected without registration.230
Another subset of trademark law, the collective mark,
symbolizes membership in a group or organization.231 For example, the mark ―CPA‖ indicates membership in the Society of
Certified Public Accountants.232 Unlike trademarks, the collec223. See id. at 120.
224. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
225. Id.
226. See Midwest Plastic Fabricators, Inc. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 906
F.2d 1568, 1569 ( Fed. Cir. 1990).
227. Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d 494, 496 (2d
Cir. 1962).
228. MCCARTHY, supra note 62, § 4:16.
229. 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2006).
230. E.g., Institut National Des Appellations d‘Origine v. Brown-Forman
Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875, 1885 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (―[T ]he term ‗Cognac‘ is recognized by purchasers in this country as a reliable indication of regional
origin.‖).
231. MCCARTHY, supra note 62, § 4:16.
232. See generally AICPA, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS.,
http://www.aicpa.org/Pages/Default.aspx ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (display-
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tive mark does not indicate that the goods or services come
from a particular source, but ―indicate[s] that their source is affiliated with a particular group.‖233 Whereas certification
marks may be used by anyone who complies with the standards
of the mark, collective marks may only be used by particular
members of an organization.234
However, in the vast majority of cases, there is no source
confusion with fashion design marks.235 Most consumers can
tell the difference between a blouse from Target and a blouse
from Chanel. However, new designers do not have the same
brand recognition as established designers.236 If an established
designer copies an emerging designer before the emerging designer‘s garments are on the rack, the consumer may not know
which design is the original.237 In this scenario, there is a concern for attribution for the new designer. Without arbitration,
the new designer may easily be cut out of the fashion cycle,
harming the individual designer, economically and morally, as
well as harming consumers by depriving the market of innovation and competition.
Certification and collective marks present attribution solutions that address this concern. A fashion design certification
mark would allow designers to distinguish original designs
from copied designs, while communicating a unique source to
consumers. A term, such as ―couture‖ or ―original design‖ or
―slow fashion‖ could be applied to apparel tags to indicate that
the garment was originally designed without line-by-line copying. A fashion design certification mark would certify an authentic ―mode of manufacture‖ and consequently ―quality‖ and
―accuracy‖ of an original design.238 This mark would not be
owned by any designer in particular, but by the group and
would be ―available without discrimination to certify the goods
of any person who maintains the standards or conditions which

ing the CPA logo as the official insignia of the Society of Certified Public Accountants).
233. MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 99 (2005); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (articulating a similar explanation regarding a collective
mark‘s expression of association).
234. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
235. Cf. Splurge vs. Steal: Stripes, MARIE CLAIRE ( Feb. 26, 2008), http://
www.marieclaire.com/fashion/tips/splurge-vs-steal/splurge-steal-stripes.
236. Scadifi Statement, supra note 161, at 82–83.
237. Id.
238. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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such mark certifies.‖239 Fast fashion retailers will likely not be
affected by a mark on original garments, but it serves a valuable purpose to prevent source confusion in the marketplace and
to provide a limited moral rights protection for fashion
designers.
In the alternative, a similar idea could be implemented
through a collective mark. The Council of Fashion Designers of
America could create a collective mark in which designers who
are part of the organization would be able to join. The CFDA
then could set standards for original designs, which may be
similar to the proposed substantially identical standard in the
IDPPPA.
The Fair Trade Mark for clothing and VARA provide valuable models for a fashion certification mark in order to craft a
limited protection that will blend with the current intellectual
property laws in the United States. Certification marks are
most commonly applied to food,240 but Fair Trade USA recently
launched a new fair trade certification mark for apparel.241
This Fair Trade certification indicates quality from farm to factory,242 and serves as a model for communicating design authenticity. Similarly, VARA serves as a guide, as a recent expansion of moral rights. Whereas VARA includes a right to
attribution and integrity, the fashion mark would be limited to
attribution, because clothing is functional and thus prone to accidental modifications.
The limited goal of preserving a right of attribution
through a certification or collective mark responds to the needs
in the fashion design community. This solution allows fashion
victims to opt in for some protection, while maintaining the
unique copying dynamic that fashion pirates enjoy.

239. Id. § 1064(5)(D); see Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc.,
303 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1962).
240. E.g., Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass‘n of Am., 104 F.3d 38, 39 (2d Cir.
1997) (analyzing kosher certification marks, which ―are used to designate food
items that comply with Judaism‘s strict dietary laws‖).
241. E.g., Apparel & Linens Program, FAIR TRADE USA (Sept. 11, 2011,
4:40 PM), http://www.transfairusa.org/certification/producers/apparel-linens;
Lorraine Sanders, Fashion First: Fair Trade Certification Finally Available for
Apparel, SFUNZIPPED, S.F. CHRON. ONLINE (July 23, 2010, 2:00 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/chronstyle/detail?entry_id=68495.
242. See Sanders, supra note 241; Ariel Schwartz, TransFair USA Introduces First Fair-Trade Clothing to the U.S., FAST COMPANY (July 19, 2010),
http://www.fastcompany.com/1671772/transfair-usa-introduces-first-fair-tradeclothing-to-the-us.
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CONCLUSION
In considering the legal conundrum of knockoffs, fashion
emerges as an incomparable industry. Clothing is an anomaly
because it is both artistic and functional, new and old, distinctive and indistinctive, and it does not fit neatly into a legal
framework. Copying—whether considered design piracy or
sharing—plays a vital role in the unique, creative culture of the
fashion world, and any proposed intellectual property changes
must consider the industry norms.
Although copying benefits the industry, the negative effect
on emerging designers is a legitimate concern, but the proposed
legislation is not the appropriate remedy. The costs of sui generis copyright protection greatly outweigh the potential benefits. Knockoffs are not harming the thriving fashion industry as
a whole, but actually playing an important role in the cycle of
trends. A solution that balances the desire for limited moral
rights without disturbing the copying dynamic would be a better fit. A certification or collective mark that communicates authenticity to the consumer would allow designers to opt in to
distinguish their original designs without forcing new rules on
a thriving industry.

